We examine theoretic architectures and an abstract model for a restricted class of quantum computation, called here instantaneous quantum computation because it allows for essentially no temporal structure within the quantum dynamics. Using the theory of binary matroids, we argue that the paradigm is rich enough to enable sampling from probability distributions that cannot, classically, be sampled from efficiently and accurately. This paradigm also admits simple interactive proof games that may convince a skeptic of the existence of truly quantum effects. Furthermore, these effects can be created using significantly fewer qubits than are required for running Shor's Algorithm.
Introduction

Motivation
It has often been said that underlying the power of quantum computers is the close connection between the computational model and the way we represent dynamics in quantum systems. This connection is implicit in the standard circuit model, where we require a universal gate set for an n-logical-qubit processor to be capable of simulating the dynamics of the n-qubit unitary group SU (2 n ). While there are many equivalent models of (universal) quantum computing, and not all of them explicitly 'generate' the special unitary group on n qubits, they each simulate (to within some pre-defined precision) operations drawn from some non-abelian unitary group on a set of qubits. Our approach in this paper departs from this well trod path, by focussing almost exclusively on an abelian subgroup of the unitary group. This approach is much more restrictive in the kinds of computation allowed, leading to a computational paradigm that lies somewhere between classical and universal quantum computing. The non-abelian nature of quantum circuit elements is undoubtedly a crucial feature of universal quantum computing; for example, it imposes a clear physical limitation to the time-ordering of the gates in a circuit. In the standard model of quantum computation, the only circuits that can be performed in a single "time-step" are those composed only of single-qubit gates and two-qubit gates that act on disjoint sets of qubits. We often refer to such circuits as depth-1 circuits. When an abelian group is being used for the gates within a circuit, that circuit need not be depth-1 in the sense just described, though it will
Overview
We introduce a restricted model for quantum computation, Instantaneous Quantum Computation, which emerges fairly naturally as the 'lowest common denominator' of several architectures under simple restrictions, based on these abelian notions. We conjecture it to be classically hard to sample many of the probability distributions that can be sampled using the polynomial-time IQP framework, (see line (1) in section 2.1). This kind of hardness conjecture seems plausible, despite the fact that it seems difficult to identify any specific decision language that can be decided efficiently by a classical machine equipped with an IQP processor that can't be decided efficiently by a classical machine on its own. However, using some constructions based on binary matroids and linear codes and some conjectures about the hardness of certain matroid combinatorial problems, we are able to find an application for the paradigm in context of a two-player interactive game. This application is perhaps the simplest known protocol, requiring (say) ∼ 200 qubits, that could be expected to convince a skeptic of the existence of some computational quantum effect. The reason for this is that there seems to be no classical method to fake even a classical transcript of a run of the interactive game between Challenger and Prover, without actually being (or subverting the secret random data of) the classical Challenger. By analogy, this protocol is to quantum computation what Bell experiments are to quantum communication : the simplest known 'proof' of a distinctly quantum phenomenon. Of course, since there is no mathematical proof published to date of a separation between the power of quantum computation and classical computation, we still have to rely on certain computational hardness conjectures.
The arguments of this paper depend informally upon several conjectures which, for the sake of clarity, we sketch up front :
• It is classically hard to sample efficiently from the probability distributions arising from IQP (section 3).
• These same probability distributions have high entropy, in the cases of concern to the interactive proof game we develop (section 3.3).
• The matroid problem on which the interactive proof game is based is hard for BPP, possibly even NP-complete (section 5.3).
• The classical 'attack' we describe for a 'cheating Prover' (which is not sufficient for satisfying the Challenger) is the best known way to simulate classically efficiently the correct probability distributions (section 4).
Demonstrating the existence of quantum computation
How can we tell when we have successfully built a quantum computer? Given that tomography quickly becomes difficult as the number of qubits in a system grows, it is pertinent to ask if there is a simpler way of verifying the success of a quantum computation. One way, which has already been attempted in several experiments, e.g. [6, 5, 7, 16] , would be to use the prototype quantum computer to find the solution to a problem which we think is difficult to solve on a classical computer.
For instance, the following scenario is generic. Alice is a skeptic, she doesn't believe that Bob has a quantum device at his disposal. Fortunately, she is relatively certain that classical computers can't efficiently find the prime factors of a large integer, whereas quantum computers can [14] (although many qubits may be required for a convincing demonstration). So she issues a challenge to Bob : she chooses a large number for which she cannot find the prime factors and sends it to Bob. If Bob then sends back the prime factors of her number within a reasonable time period, she can easily convince herself that Bob must have had a quantum device at his disposal.
This scenario in particular is one which has been used in attempts to verify the success of several small-scale quantum computers [6, 5, 7] , though of course the numbers used were too small to be considered hard to factor classically. Unfortunately, so far as we know, Shor's factoring algorithm is a relatively difficult quantum algorithm to perform. It is well known that it can be implemented in a circuit model using polynomial circuit depth and linear circuit width, or alternatively with constant depth and polynomially-wide quantum circuits [3] . In either case, we'd apparently require a fully universal set of quantum gates, and more than a thousand logical qubits, for a convincing demonstration. In this paper, we suggest a protocol which could be used to test the success of a quantum device, which we believe is physically far less complex than factorization. We establish a problem class that we conjecture Bob cannot solve classically, (indeed, we shall see that it is unlikely that Bob could "fully solve" this problem -recovering Alice's secret random dataeven with a universal quantum computer). But it will be seen that access to an IQP oracle is sufficient to enable Bob to provide evidence that he has performed a genuinely quantum computation. We claim that our protocol is simpler to implement than all known versions of Shor's algorithm, not requiring anything like a universal gate set. The IQP paradigm uses quantum evolutions where, aside from some separable initialisation and separate final measurement of qubits, no transformations are allowed except some limited class of unitaries all of which commute pairwise. This paradigm has an interesting description not only in the circuit model, but also in a particular version of measurementbased quantum computing, where such evolutions can be implemented within a single timeslice, not counting the initial preparation and final post-processing [2] . It is natural to think of IQP as a probabilistic oracle to which a classical Turing machine is given access. We show some of the difficulties associated with trying to find any actual decision language that can't be decided by BPP without access to IQP (or other quantum processing,) yet we also discuss reasons for believing BPP = BPP IQP , at least as computational paradigms if not as complexity classes.
Structure of this paper
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the computational paradigm IQP and demonstrate a number of architectures which qualify for this label. We then proceed with an analysis of IQP in Section 3 by finding a closed form for the set of probability distributions that belong naturally to the paradigm. In this section we also demonstrate a link between IQP and the theory of binary matroids, which we later exploit. In Section 4 we use methods from the theory of cryptanalysis to give further evidence for why with think that no efficient purely classical process will make for an IQP oracle. We give a classical recipe for a random variable that poorly approximates such an oracle in a particular case, and argue for its being the best classical approximation available in that case. Based on this analysis, in section 5 we're able to prescribe a family of two-player interactive games in which Bob has to convince Alice that he has IQP capabilities. The protocol for the game is formalized, and we give a worked example of the constructions used. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of potential future directions and a link to some source-code for implementing the role of the (purely classical) Challenger/Verifier, Alice. There is an appendix, to where some of the more verbose proofs have been relegated.
Architectures
In this section we sketch three different quantum computing architectures, mentioned now by way of overview. The first is relevant for the entire paper; the second and third are provided by way of background and context. Programs for the first of these architectures we call "X-programs", since the Hamiltonian that is implemented can be efficiently described as a sum of products of Pauli X transformations on computational-basis qubits. This will be seen to have the property that there is no inherent temporal structure to the evolution, in the sense that the gates that correspond to the terms of such an Hamiltonian may be implemented in any order, or possibly even simultaneously.
Programs for the second architecture we call "Graph-programs", since the program is most easily described as the construction of a graph state followed by a series of measurements of the qubits in the graph state in various bases [2] . A graph state has qubits that are initially devoid of information, but which are entangled together according to the pattern of some pre-specified graph. A graph state can be constructed without inherent temporal complexity, perhaps even prepared in a single computational time-step, because there is no implicit reason requiring one edge of the graph (one aspect of entanglement) to be prepared before any other. (It is still fair to argue that the circuit-depth of the process that generates a graph state is linear in the valency of the graph, but that is not a measure of 'inherent' temporal complexity.) Unlike universal graph state computation, our "Graph-programs" do not admit adaptive feed-forward, which is to say that all measurement angles must be known and fixed at compile-time, so that all measurements can be made simultaneously once the graph state has been built. In this sense, the 'depth' of a Graph-program is 1. We will show how "Graph-programs" can simulate the output of "X-programs" if a little trivial classical post-processing of the measurement results is allowed.
Programs for the third architecture we call "Z-networks", since the program is most easily described as a network of gates on an array of qubits, where the allowed gate-set includes just the Controlled-Not gate from any qubit to any qubit and the single-qubit gate that implements the Pauli Z Hamiltonian for some time. Although this "Z-network" architecture does have a notion of temporal structure -because it is important the order in which the gates of the network are carried out -nonetheless it is useful for our analysis because it turns out to have effectively the same computational power as the "X-program architecture" under some basic assumptions, and the Lie group structure underpinning the kinds of transformation allowable within the "Z-network" architecture is particularly easy to work with.
In what follows, we expand on these three architectures.
X-programs
In the "X-program" architecture, we allow for a set of n qubits, initialised into the pure separable computational basis state | 0 . The program is specified as a (polysize) list of pairs (θ p , p) ∈ [0, 2π] × n 2 , so θ p is an angle and p is a string of n bits. Each such program element (pair) is interpreted as the action of a Hamiltonian on the qubits indicated by p, applied for action 1 θ p : the Hamiltonian to apply is made up from a product of Pauli X operators on the indicated qubits, and naturally these all commute. This means that -in principle -the program elements could all be applied simultaneously. The measurement to be performed, once all the Hamiltonians have been applied, is simply a computational-basis measurement, and the program output is simply that measurement result, regarded as a (probabilistic) sample from the vectorspace n 2 . Combining this together, we see that the probability distribution for such an output is
The random variable X here codifies this probability distribution of classical output samples.
It is possible to generalise this architecture further, by allowing for different (separable) input states and/or different measurement bases. Such generalisation naturally leads to a probability distribution with many more controlable parameters, but the analysis quickly becomes much harder, and is not necessary for the points we wish to make in this paper.
Graph-programs
Graph state computing architectures are popular candidates for scalable fully universal quantum processors [11, 10] . Here we are concerned not with universal architectures, but with the appropriate restriction to 'unit time' computation. In the "Graph-programs"
presented, no adaptation of measurement bases is to be permitted, so that all measurements can be made within the first time-slice of the computation.
A Graph-program is taken to be an undirected (usually bipartite) graph with labelled and distinguished vertices. The vertex set is denoted V , of cardinality n, and for each v ∈ V there is an element of SU (2) labelling it; R v ∈ SU (2). The edge set is denoted E. To implement the program, a qubit is associated with each vertex and is initialised to the state | + in the Hadamard basis. Then a Controlled-Z Pauli gate is applied between each pair of qubits whose vertices are a pair in E. Since these Controlled-Z gates commute, they may be applied simultaneously, at least in theory. Finally, each vertex qubit v is measured in the direction prescribed by its label R v , returning a single classical bit. Clearly the order of measurement doesn't matter, because the measurement direction is prescribed rather than adaptive. Hence a sample from n 2 (a bit-string) is thus generated as the total measurement result. Combining this together, we see that the probability distribution for such an output is
Here the measurement has been written using the notation of the computational basis, with an appropriate (passive) rotation immediately prior.
Z-networks
The network-or circuit-model of computation is perhaps the most familiar one. On the understanding that n qubits are initialised into | 0 in the computational basis and ultimately measured in the computational basis, it is well known that the gate-set consisting of Controlled-Not gates together with all single-qubit rotations is universal for BQP, and the Lie group generated by this gate-set generates the whole of SU (2 n ), modulo global phase. By the term "Z-network" we mean explicitly to limit the single-qubit gates to being those which implement e iθZ for some action θ, so that the Lie group spanned by the gate-set (represented in the computational basis) consists of unitary matrices that are supported by permutation matrices, i.e. those unitaries that have just one non-zero entry per row. Any such unitary can be factored into a diagonal matrix followed by a permutation matrix. (In all cases, global phase is to be regarded as physically irrelevant, and may be 'quotiented out' from the groups in question.) We can describe groups by giving generator sets for them. The group containing all permutations and diagonal elements is Toffoli, C-Not, X, e iθZ = any permutation, any diagonal .
This 'qualifies' as a Z-network group; indeed, all Z-network groups are to be a subgroup of this one. But for the purposes of comparison with X-programs and the IQP paradigm, it 6 suffices to consider the much simpler group given by C-Not, X, e iθZ = any linear permutation, any diagonal .
[The X gate is necessary to enable the construction of all diagonals, but one might prefer to replace implementation of X by the availability of an ancilla | 1 qubit, so that a C-Not gate can simulate an X gate. This latter group does not even contain (efficiently) the dynamics of classical computation. In the language of complexity theory, (3) stands in relation to (4) as P stands to L.] One can see how to build a variety of constructions within the group at line (4), using the specified gate-set. E.g. by conjugating e iθZ 1 with two C-Not gates one can create an e iθZ 1 Z 2 composite unitary. Figure 1 shows the efficient extension of this process to create an e iθZ 1 Z 2 Z 3 Z 4 composite unitary. [Note that this gate is not the same as a triply-controlled-Z gate, as can most easily be seen by considering the dimensions of the various eigenspaces of the unitaries in question.] 
Reductions
It is not our intention to make any physical claims based on the architecture of "Z-networks", because the required constructions are likely to be inefficient, i.e. the circuit depth of one of these networks simulating a random X-program is likely to be greater than the number of Hamiltonian terms in the X-program being simulated, in general. Rather, we wish only to point out that this neat mathematical structure (i.e. as at line (4)) would enable probability distributions of the kind at line (1) to be simulated, simply by initialising the input qubits to | + n in the Hadamard basis and measuring output in the same Hadamard basis.
Conversely, it is simple to find an X-program that efficiently simulates a given Z-network, provided that that Z-network uses Hadamard-basis input, C-Nots, X gates, and e iθZ gates only, and outputs in the Hadamard basis. The required reduction just associates one Xprogram element (θ p , p) to each e iθZ gate, setting θ p ← θ and specifying p according to the location of the e iθZ gate and the totality of C-Not gates to the left of that gate, using essentially the same kinds of identity as depicted in Figure 1 . A final piece of simple postprocessing is needed after the measurement phase of the X-program, to account for the C-Nots in the Z-network, but this post-processing simply consists in applying the same C-Nots (with directions reversed) on the classical measurement outcomes. (This is because moving from the Hadamard basis to the computational basis has the effect of reversing the direction of C-Not gates.)
The point of these reductions is to highlight the sense in which the group associated to simple Z-networks stands in the same relation to the set of X-programs as the 'full' SU (2 n ) Lie group stands to the set of proper full-blown quantum algorithms.
Having described these three architectures, we've indicated that the "X-programs", characterised by the formulation at line (1) , are in some natural sense the 'lowest common denominator' amongst the architectures (and unitary groups) of interest; it remains only to show how a Graph-program can be designed to simulate an X-program efficiently.
The reduction from X-programs to Graph-programs : Suppose we're given an X-program, written { (θ p , p) : p ∈ P ⊂ n 2 }. Then it is straightforward to simulate it on a Graph State architecture, as follows. Let V be the disjoint union of [1. .n] and P , so that the graph state used to simulate the program will have one primal qubit for each qubit being simulated, plus one ancilla qubit for each program element p, the total cardinality of V being polynomial in n, by hypothesis. Let (j, p) ∈ E exactly when the jth component of p is a 1. In this way, the resulting graph is bipartite, linking primal qubits to those ancillae that they have to do with. Let R j be the Hadamard element (H) for all primal qubits, so that all primal qubits are measured in the Hadamard basis. Let R p = exp(iθ p X), so that every ancilla qubit is measured in the (Y Z)-plane at an angle specified by the corresponding program element.
If the resulting Graph-program is executed, it will return a sample vector x ∈ n+#P 2 for which the n bits from the primal qubits are correlated with the #P bits from the ancillae in a fashion which captures the desired output, (though these two sets separately -marginally -will look like flat random data.) To recover a sample from the desired distribution, we simply apply a classical Controlled-Not gate from each ancilla bit to each neighbouring primal bit, according to E, and then discard all the ancilla bits. One can use simple circuit identities to check that this produces the correct distribution (1) precisely.
We note in passing that the kinds of graph called for in this particular reduction are not the usual cluster state graphs that correspond to a regular planar lattice arrangement that are normally used in measurement-based quantum computation. The bipartite graphs described in the reduction will usually be far from planar for the X-programs that we'll be considering, having a relatively high genus.
Simulability and background
We write the common paradigm presented by any of these architectures as IQP -to denote 'instantaneous quantum computation', indicating an absence of inherent temporal structure -and write the overall paradigm as BPP IQP , to denote the fact that classical randomised polytime pre-and post-processing is usually to be considered allowed in a simulation, and to denote the fact that we don't much care which of several quantum architectures might be being used to supply the 'IQP-power' of sampling from probability distributions of the form at line (1). This notation is not necessarily supposed to indicate a particular class of decision languages as such, but rather a particular class of computations. The particular interactive proof games that we'll later be focussing on require the Prover to have access to an IQP oracle, and to access it a polynomial number of times, though these accesses may be made in parallel and without precomputation.
In support of the supposed complexity of this paradigm, Terhal and Divincenzo [17] , and Aaronson [1] , have already showed that it is PP-complete to strongly simulate the generic probability distributions that arise hence. In the appendix of this paper, we give a specific proof of the hardness of strongly simulating at x = 0 for arbitrary X-programs, i.e. proof of hardness of computing È(X = 0) (from line (1)) to exponential precision.
There has been a wide range of work into discovering restricted models of quantum computation which are classically simulable. For example, quantum circuits generating limited forms of entanglement, with classical simulations based on analysing matrix product states or contracting tensor networks; these circuits have a particularly constrained 'circuit-topology', which leads to their simplicity (see [8] for a summary of known results). There is no particular circuit-topology imposed in our Z-network architecture, so it seems unlikely that the same methods would apply here. Other positive classical simulability results include the stabiliser circuits of the Gottesmann-Knill theorem and various matchgate constructions (see [18, 4, 13, 12] and references therein). These constructions differ significantly from our Z-networks in terms of the underlying algebra, the group generated by the set of allowable gates. Høyer and Spalek [3] have shown that Shor's algorithm for Integer Factorisation can indeed be performed within a constant number of timesteps on a Graph State processor, though their constructions offer no reason to believe that that constant might be smaller than, say, ∼ 100; and of course, a general methodology for reducing the inherent time-complexity of oracle-dependent quantum search algorithms is known to be impossible, due to lower bounds on Grover's algorithm. Dan Browne [2] wrote about CD-decomposability, which is the first rigorous treatment that we know of that explicitly links Graph State temporal depth with commutativity of Hamiltonian terms used to simulate a Graph state computation.
Dan Simon [15] wrote about algorithms that use nothing more than an oracle and a Hadamard transform, and which therefore could be described as 'instantaneous'. However, his notion of 'oracle' was one tailored for a universal quantum architecture, being essentially an arbitrarily complex general unitary transformation, and since there is no natural notion of one of these within the 'instantaneous' paradigm, there is no real sense in which Simon's algorithm can count as an example of an algorithm within the BPP IQP framework. In particular, Simon's oracle implements a unitary that does not commute with the Hadamard transform.
Quantum Analysis
For a formal definition of what is meant by an IQP oracle, we mean any device that interfaces to a probabilistic Turing machine via an 'oracle tape', so that if the oracle tape holds a description of a particular X-program P at the time when the Turing machine calls its 'implement oracle' instruction, then in unit time (or perhaps in time polynomial in the length of the description of P ), a bitstring sample from the probability distribution at line (1) is created and written to the oracle tape, and control is passed back to the Turing machine to continue processing. Our interest lies primarily not in the decision languages that BPP can decide with access to such an oracle, but in the wider notions of computing that go beyond mere decision languages, to encompass other computational concepts such as interactive games.
It is possible to form various hardness conjectures about the classical simulation of these IQP probability distributions. For a randomly chosen X-program P of a given size n, it seems likely that the associated IQP distribution would be exponentially close to flat random. Conditioned on its not being random, there is no particular reason to think it would be approximately efficiently classically samplable. Here is an example of one such conjecture, though the precise details are not important to our arguments. This particular hardness conjecture is not quite what we really require, but it gives an example of a plausible conjecture about classical simulation, and implies that for almost any X-program of interest, there is a certain event (subset of output possibilities) whose probability will (probably) be estimated wrongly by your favourite classical polynomial-time event-probability-estimating device. (Many similar conjectures sound equally plausible, in an area where almost nothing is known for sure.)
The hardness conjecture that we will actually use later in section 5, albeit implicitly, is one which asserts that, for a particularly designed family of X-programs, each having an IQP probability distribution with a high (O(n)) collision entropy and a certain particularly likely (p > 0.85) linear event (hyperplane in the space of output possibilities), your favourite classical polynomial-time algorithm will yield a probability distribution that either has exceptionally low collision entropy, or else has a polynomially small probability (over Xprograms from the stated family, in the size of the X-program) of getting within a constant bound (say 0.05, i.e. p > 0.80) of the correct value for the probability of the hidden event in question. (This conjecture is tied to the particular construction in section 5.2.) But rather than speculate at this stage on which of the very many possible conjectures may or may not be true (knowing that we cannot establish any of them without at least separating P from BQP), we instead turn back to an examination of the mathematical structures underpinning the probability distributions in question.
Probability distribution
Starting from the equation at line (1), we can make a formulaic simplification as follows. Let P denote the binary matrix whose rows are the p vectors of the X-program under consideration. Then using the fact that the Hamiltonian terms in line (1) all commute, we can express the probability (amplitude) as a sum over paths :
In fact, for our present purposes it suffices to limit to the 'Constant Action' case, whereby rather than allow for arbitrary values for θ p in an X-program, all these values are the same θ. Then, for any vector s ∈ n 2 we can write
where wt denotes the Hamming weight function, and #P counts the number of rows of P , which is the number of elements in the X-program. It is appropriate to interpret this formula in terms of binary matroids.
Binary matroids and Linear binary codes
There are many different, isomorphic, definitions for matroids, [9] . We shall adopt the definition that a k-point binary matroid is an equivalence class of matrices defined over 2 , where each matrix in the equivalence class has exactly k rows, and M 1 ∼ M 2 implies that for some (k-by-k) permutation matrix Q, the column-echelon reduced form of M 1 is the same as the column-echelon reduced form of Q · M 2 . Here we take column-echelon reduction to delete empty columns, so that the result is full-rank. Hence the rank of a matroid is the rank of any of its representatives.
For any n-long binary vector s, if we define P s to be the submatrix of P obtained by deleting all rows p for which p · s T = 0, leaving only those rows for which p · s T = 1, then we can deduce from line (6) that the probability È(X · s T = 0) depends only on θ and the binary matroid represented by P s . A proof of this fact follows shortly, and is completed in the appendix. Binary matroids are related to binary codes in the following sense. If P s is an n s -by-n binary matrix representing a matroid, then if we let C s denote the linear binary code spanned by the columns of P s , then the length of the code is n s , the rank of the code is the rank of the matroid, and the effect of choosing a different P s that represents the same binary matroid simply leads to an isomorphic code that has the same weight-enumerator polynomial as the original C s . We can even show that the probability È(X · s T = 0) depends only on θ and the weight-enumerator polynomial of the code C s defined thus. These deductions are a bit tedious, so we've put them in the appendix. The conclusion of the matter is that È(X · s
To recap, this means that if we run an X-program using the action value θ for all program elements, then the probability of the returned sample being orthogonal to an s of our choosing ('orthogonal' in the 2 sense of having zero dot-product with s) depends only on θ and on the (weight enumerator polynomial of the) linear code obtained by writing the program elements p as rows of a matrix and ignoring those that are orthogonal to s.
Entropy, and trivial cases
As with all functions of Tutte polynomials, there are a few easy cases that should be highlighted and dismissed up front.
If θ is a multiple of π then the returned sample will always be 0, because for all s, È(X·s T = 0) = 1. This fact can also be seen directly from line (5), since there is then a sin(π) factor in every term unless x = 0.
If θ is an odd multiple of π/2 then the returned sample will always be p∈P p. This fact is also most immediately perceived by considering line (5), since then every term contains a cos(π/2) factor except for the term whereby all the p vectors are summed together.
In either of the two cases above, the Renyi entropy is zero. This entropy (denoted S 2 ) measures the randomness of the sampling process by measuring the likelihood of two (independent) samples being the same. It is defined as
If θ is an odd multiple of π/4 then the probability distribution may have a non-trivial entropy, yet by the Gottesmann-Knill theorem there is nonetheless a classically efficient method for sampling from it. This follows because then all the gates in the program would be Clifford gates, so the evolution of the state can be tracked using stabilisers, etc. For other sufficiently different values of the action parameter, classical intractibility becomes a highly plausible conjecture (cf. [13, 12] ). In particular, the remainder of this paper will specialise to the case θ = π/8, since we are able to make all our points about the utility of IQP even with this restriction.
Conjecture 2 The Renyi entropy of the probability distribution of a randomly selected Xprogram, with constant action π/8, typically scales as n − O(1) with the size of the program.
This conjecture is implicitly relevant to the design of the kind of hypothesis test that can legitimately be used to constitute the final part of the interactive proof game discussed later, but might not be directly relevant to the 'hardness' of the IQP paradigm.
Classical Approximations
Suppose we wish to define a probability distribution that arises from some purely classical methods, which can be used to approximate our IQP distribution. Our motivation here is to check whether any purported application for an IQP oracle might not be efficiently implemented without any quantum technology. We proceed using the relatively ad hoc methods of linear differential cryptanalysis. For the case θ = π/8, we will need to consider only second-order derivatives. The same sort of method will apply to the case θ = π/2 d+1 using dth order derivatives, but the presentation would not be improved by considering that general case here.
In terms of our binary matrix/X-program P , proceed by defining
and notate discrete directional derivatives as
Consider also the second derivatives of f , given by
each of which is quite patently a linear function in the bits (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of a, as a function with codomain the ring /16 , regardless of the choice of directions d, e. (See appendix.)
In the appendix, we prove that for all s,
and so the IQP probability distribution (in the case θ = π/8) may be viewed as a function of f rather than as a function of P .
And so if there is a hidden s such that È(X · s T = 0) = 1, then that implies f s (a) ≡ 0 (mod 16) for all a. This is essentially a non-oracular form of the kind of function that arises in applications of Simon's Algorithm [15] , with s playing the role of a hidden shift. One could find linear equations for such an s if it exists, because it would follow immediately that f d,e (s) = f d,e (0) for any directions d, e, which is by line (10) equivalent with
To make use of this specific second-order differential property, we need to analyse the probability distribution that a classical player can generate efficiently from it. Proceed by defining a new probability distribution
which is classically rendered by choosing d, e ∈ n 2 independently with a uniform distribution, and then returning the sum of all rows in P that are not orthogonal to either d or e.
In the appendix, we prove a simple formula hence :
Since this also is patently invariant under invertible linear action on the right and permutation action on the left, it too is a matroid invariant, depending on the hidden string s.
Thus we have established some kind of correlation between random variables X and Y, because we have shown that
The only counterexamples to the converse implication seem to occur in the trivial cases whereby the binary matroid P s has circuits of length 2, i.e. where P s has repeated rows.
Note that if È(X · s T = 0) were equal to 1 precisely, then by making a list of samples from IQP runs, storing them in a matrix, and performing Gaussian Elimination to recover the kernel of the matrix, it would be straightforward to compute the hidden s. However, line (16) shows that this is exactly the condition required for being able to compute s via purely classical means. For this reason, it seems hard to find decision languages that plausibly lie in BPP IQP \BPP. This random variable Y is the 'best classical approximation' that we have been able to find for X. (The intuition is that it captures all of the 'local' information in the function f , which is to say all the 'local' information in the matroid P , so that the only data left unaccounted for and excluded from use within building this classical distribution is the 'nonlocal' matroid information, which is readily available to the quantum distribution via the magic of Hadamard transformation.) There seems to be no other sensible way of processing P (or f ) classically, to obtain useful samples efficiently, though it also seems hard to make any rigorous statement to that effect. In the remainder of the paper we assume -without proof -that Y is the best classically efficient approximation available for approximately simulating IQP oracles in the games that we choose to analyse. So our next task is to look for decision languages, proofs, games, etc., that can be rendered with access to X (IQP), but cannot be sufficiently well approximated using only access to Y (classical simulation attempts).
Interactive Games
We would like to find some 'use' for the ability to sample from the probability distribution that arises from an instantaneous quantum program; a 'task' or 'proof' that can be completed using e.g. an X-program, which could not be completed by purely classical means.
Concept overview
Consider therefore the following game, between Alice and Bob. Alice, also called the Challenger/Verifier, is a classical player with access to a private random number generator. Bob, also called the Prover, is a supposedly quantum player, whose goal is to convince Alice that he can access an IQP oracle, i.e. run X-programs. The rules of this game are that he has to convince her simply by sending classical data, and so in effect Bob offers to act as a remote IQP oracle for Alice, while Alice is initially skeptical of Bob's true abilities. The game might begin with Alice choosing some particular secret vector s and a code C s . She then finds a matrix P s whose columns generate the code (not necessarily as a basis), none of whose rows is orthogonal to s. She chooses the code in such a way that there is a θ for which the (quantum) expectation value at line (7) is somewhere well within ( 1 2 , 1), and for which the corresponding best-known classical approximation expectation value (e.g. presumably the one at line (15) in case θ = π/8) is significantly smaller.
She then obfuscates the matrix P s by appending arbitrary rows that are orthogonal to s, and permutes the row order randomly. The matrix that she is left with, P , she publishes.
Bob, being BPP IQP -capable by hypothesis, may interpret the published P as an Xprogram, to be run with the (constant) action set to θ = π/8 (say). He will be able to generate random vectors which independently have the correct probability of being orthogonal to Alice's secret s, and although he may still be entirely unable to recover this s from such samples, he nonetheless can send to Alice a list of these samples as proof that he is BPP IQP -capable. Note that Bob's strategy is error-tolerant, because if each run of the IQP algorithm were to use a 'noisy' θ value, then the overall proof that he generates will still be valid, providing the noise is small and unbiased and independent between runs.
Since Alice knows the secret value s, and can presumably compute the parameter È(X·s T = 0) from the code's weight enumerator polynomial (recall that she is free to choose any C s that suits her purpose), it is not hard for her to use a hypothesis test to confirm that the samples Bob sends are commensurate with having been sampled independently from the same distribution that an X-program generates. Alice should ensure a large Renyi entropy for the true (IQP) distribution, since she will want to remove all 'short circuits' (i.e. all the empty rows and all the duplicate rows) from Bob's data, before testing it, to make a test that is both fair and efficient. In this way, Bob will have 'proved' to Alice that he ran a quantum computation on her program, provided she is confident that there is no feasible way for Bob to simulate the 'proof' data classically efficiently, i.e. provided she has performed her hypothesis test correctly against a plausibly best null hypothesis. This kind of interactive game could be of much significance to validation of early quantum computing architectures, since it gives rise to a simple way of 'tomographically ascertaining' the actual presence of at least some quantum computing, modulo some relatively basic complexity assumptions. In this sense it is to quantum computation what Bell violation experiments are to quantum communication. Of course, this test really comes into its own when the architecture being tested happens to have the undesirable engineering feature of being unable to sustain long-term quantum coherence, and therefore perhaps only ever being capable of shallow-depth computation.
Note that this 'testing concept' does not use the IQP paradigm to compute any data that is unknown to everyone, nor does it directly provide Bob with any 'secret' data that could be used as a witness to validate an NP language membership claim. Its only effect is to provide Bob with data that he can't use for any purpose other than to pass on to Alice as a 'proof' of IQP-capability. It is an open problem to find something more commonly associated with computation -perhaps deciding a decision language, for example -that can be achieved specifically by the BPP IQP paradigm.
So there are three aspects of design involved in specifying an actual game :
A) a code/matroid construction, for Alice to select a problem, B) an architecture or technique for Bob to take samples from the IQP distribution, A') an hypothesis test for Alice to use to verify (or reject) Bob's attempt.
Since we claim to have already identified the best known classical approximation method for θ = π/8, we next show a specific example of a construction methodology (with implicit test methodology) for Alice, which should be asymptotically secure (against cheating Prover) and efficient (for both Prover and Verifier).
Recommended construction method
In this section, we provide an example of a family of codes that our classical player 'Alice' may well be able to employ within the context of the game outlined above. Significantly, our example has the property that there is a non-negligible gap between the quantumand best-known-classical-approximation expectation values, both of which are significantly below 1.
Consider a quadratic residue code over 2 with respect to the prime q, chosen so that q + 1 is a multiple of eight. The rank of such a code is k = (q + 1)/2, and the length is q. To make the code, one needs to find a cyclic generator codeword for it. A generator polynomial for such a cyclic generator is simply (X + α) · (X + α 4 ) · (X + α 9 ) · · · (X + α (k−1) 2 ), where α is any (non-trivial) qth root of unity in the algebraic closure of the binary Galois field. This polynomial is irreducible over 2 (which is its field of definition), and its coefficients indicate a generator codeword (generating using cyclic rotations). Perhaps more simply, a cyclic generator codeword is exemplified by that codeword which has a 1 in the jth place if and only if the Legendre symbol j q = 1. Were this code extended by a single parity-check bit, it would become a doubly even code, self-dual, so that both È(X · s T = 0) and È(Y · s T = 0) would be 1. As it is, it contains a mix of even-length and odd-length codewords, and one may readily compute parameters for it :
È(X · s
To compute these parameters, note that n s = q ≡ 8 7, and note that since every codeword in the extended code has weight a multiple of 4, so weights are ≡ 4 0 or −1 in the unextended code. In the extended code, any two codewords are orthogonal, and so in the unextended code, two codewords are non-orthogonal only if they are both odd-parity, which happens a quarter of the time.
Mathematical problem description
The method of obfuscation of section 5.2 amounts to, mathematically speaking, a situation whereby for each suitable prime q, we start by acknowledging a particular (public) q-point binary matroid Q, viz the one obtained from the QR-Code of length q. Then an 'instance' of the obfuscation consists of a published 2q-point (say) binary matroid P , and there is to be a hidden subset O such that Q = P \O; and the practical instances occur with P chosen effectively at random, subject to these constraints. (One could choose to make O bigger than q points if that were desired.) This has the feel of a fairly generic hidden substructure problem, so it seems likely that it should be NP-hard to determine the hidden Q, given P and the appropriate promise of Q's existence within. More syntactically, we should like to prove that it is NP-complete to decide the related matter of whether or not P is of the specified form, given only a matrix for P . Clearly this problem is in NP, since one could provide Q in the appropriate basis as witness. We conjecture this problem to be NP-complete.
Conjecture 3
The language of matroids P that contain a quadratic-residue code submatroid Q by point deletion, where the size of Q is at least half the size of P , is NP-complete under polytime reductions.
These sorts of conjecture are apparently independent of the previous conjectures about hardness of classical efficient IQP simulation, since they indicate that actually identifying the hidden data is hard, even for a universal quantum computer.
Worked example
A toy example seems apt.
Let q = 7, k = 4, generator polynomial = 1 + X 2 + X 3 .
Below, left, is the generator matrix for the QR-Code. Columns are codewords. We also show (below, right,) the same matrix, but with the redundant all-ones vector included to make the construction easier. 
Next we write down the matrix with a few extra (random) obfuscation rows appended properly. The obfuscation rows are identified by the leading zero, whereas the code rows all have a leading 1. (These new rows happen to have maximal rank k, and we chose to insert q of them, for 'balanced' obfuscation.) We also show the same matrix after a random permutation of the rows. 
This is the column-reduced form of the previous matrix, then restated with some nonrandom row permutations to make things look more orderly. 
Full column-reduction serves as an effective way of simulating a random choice of s, without actually having to bother to make that choice. It also prunes out unnecessary dependent columns, which serve only to increase the complexity of the program implementation without providing any new data or data obfuscation. (In this example, there were none such.) In this matrix it is no longer apparent which rows pertain causally to the selected QR-code, and which are random.
A little bit of computational experimentation to compute the probabilities, etc, described at line (1) for θ = π/8, shows quite clearly that the probability distribution arising from the IQP methodology behaves as expected, with no significantly untoward features.
In this example, the hidden s value (due to column reduction) is (0, 1, 1, 1, 0). The causal 'hidden' binary matroid is the one generated from the q rows that are not orthogonal to this s.
It is worth noting that È(X = 0) is rather large in the example, and should be artificially removed from the distribution, since the zero vector ought not be allowed in the proof. In the case of a larger example, such a 'normalisation' process would have a negligible effect on the parameters. A large collision entropy is needed if Bob's sample data-set is expected to contain no duplicate entries. The collision entropy is 2.55 bits in this 5-qubit example.
6 Closing Remarks
Challenge
It seems reasonable to conjecture that, using the methodology described, with a QR-code having a value q ∼ 500, it is very easy to create randomised Interactive Game challenges for BPP IQP -capability, whose distributions have large entropy, which should lead to datasets that would be easy to validate and yet infeasible to forge without an IQP-capable computing device (or knowledge of the secret s vector). We propose such challenges as being appropriate 'targets' for early quantum architectures, since such challenges would essentially seem to be the simplest ones available (at least in terms of inherent temporal structure and number of qubits) that can't apparently be classically met.
Accordingly, we have posted on the internet (http://quantumchallenges.wordpress.com) a $25 challenge problem, of size q = 487, to help motivate further study. This challenge website includes the source code (C) used to make the challenge matrix, and also the source code of the program that we will use to check candidate solutions, excluding only the secret seed value that we used to randomise the problem.
Future work
We might also recommend the further study of matroid invariants through quantum techniques, or perhaps the invariants of weighted matroids, since they seem to be the natural objects of IQP computation as hitherto circumscribed. This would seem to be fertile ground for developing examples of things that only genuine quantum computers can achieve.
Note that if it weren't for the correlation described at line (16), then it would be possible to conceive of a mechanism whereby an IQP-capable device could compute an actual secret or witness to something (e.g. learn s), so that the computation wouldn't require two rounds of player interaction to achieve something non-trivial. Yet as it stands, it is an open problem to suggest tasks for this paradigm involving just one or zero rounds of communication. Here we have used the standard Fourier decomposition of a periodic function, and used the fact that the function is known to be real. The variable substitution at the third line was c = P s ·a T , understood in the correct basis. At the fourth line it was w = (2n s − j)/4. 
È(X
Line (11)
Derive the form of line (11) from the definition of f . 
Line (12)
Derive line (12) for all s, in the case where θ = π/8, using the working of the section above and the notation given at lines (9, 10). The first line is copied verbatim from above. The second line is obtained immediately thence, using the definition of f . The third line follows because the expression is realvalued.
È(X
Line (15)
Derive line (15) from line (14) . .
È(Y
The first line follows from the obvious substitutions c 1 = P s · d T , c 2 = P s · e T . The last line follows because unimodular actions on the left or right of a quadratic form (such as (P T s ·P s )) affect neither its rank nor the probabilities derived from it, so it suffices to consider the cases where it is in Smith Normal Form, i.e. diagonal, which are trivially verified.
